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The Evolution of European Security: From Confrontation to Cooperation
The people of Europe have cooperated with each other and fought each other through centuries. The majority of wars known to mankind occurred on the European continent. Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, Danish Army, former commandant of the Baltic Defense College noted that "during the past the human generated earthquake events normally had their epicenter in Europe, even if the largest part of the world's human population lives elsewhere." 1 It took the horrors of two world wars for Europeans to finally set aside their disputes and to choose peaceful coexistence on a more permanent basis. The creation of the European Union (EU) provided an opportunity for the people of Europe to establish a common political, economic and security community.
Building a new Security Community within post World War II (WW II) Europe was the noble ambition that allowed for peaceful coexistence and further political and economic development of the EU.
2 Dr. Jan Hallenber refers to the concept of "security community"
as a study of "…possible ways in which men some day may abolish war." 3 He noted that "there is a stable core of security in the EU, characterized by the absence of any risk of war between its members, or in other words: a pluralistic security community." 4 Hallenberg maintains that, "in the present European security community there is a very stable nucleus, in which war and the threat of war between members has for all practical purposes disappeared. To be precise, the states that are members of at least one of the two crucial organizations -NATO and the European Union, together form this security community." 5 However, while Europe has succeeded in building its own security community, it is surrounded by unstable regions and states on the periphery, which may potentially destabilize Europe`s "core of security." 6 The Balkans, the Western Mediterranean, the Middle East, Ukraine and Russia, all constitute the new challenges for the present European security system. The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989) and the subsequent evolutions in Eastern Europe, the German unification (October 1990), the demise of the Warsaw pact (April 1991) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era, in which the political, economic and military East-West conflict has disappeared, as the nuclear threat has, too.
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The new post Cold War security dilemma appeared for Europe due to the fact that "in one sense, the Cold War security system in Europe was very stable during the Cold The national power of small countries depends on the size of their territories, populations and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 33 The small countries are well aware, that due to their limited national instruments of power, they are often subject to the manipulation of big actors in the international system. Driven by the matter of national survival small countries often have no other option but to seek membership of larger security organizations and coalitions. 34 "The principle of equality observed in the supranational institutions gives the small states structural power which is used trying to compensate for the deficit of comparative power." Table 1 ). The cooperation preference with NATO is strengthened by the latest developments of economic and military relationships between Germany, France and Russia.
36 Table 1 . Memberships overlap between EU and NATO member countries. While Eurocontinentalists maintain the idea of creating a European army, the lack of a common threat makes it unlikely the European states will create a European army in the foreseeable future. In this context, the next section of this paper will examine the legal framework of the EU`s security policy and application of military force for various contingencies.
Organizing for Security within the European Union
By signing the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU became responsible for its own security as an entity. 37 The treaty allowed the EU to develop the European Security Strategy which was approved by the European Council and came into force in December 2003. 38 Its headline reads: "A secure Europe in a better World." 39 The document outlines "three strategic objectives for the EU: addressing threats, building security in the EU`s neighborhood, and developing an international order based on multilateralism." 40 This document can be considered as a joint European security strategy that is equivalent to the National Security Strategy of any sovereign state.
However, it does not replace the National Defense Strategies of its member states.
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The Security Strategy does not focus purely on the security interdependence between EU member states, but affirms European interests and the EU`s role as a global player in support of a rule-based international order underpinned by the United Nations (UN). 41 The introduction reads: "…the European Union is inevitably a global player… it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world." 42 By addressing emerging threats, the strategy recognizes that: "In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.
…The first line of defense will be often abroad."
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The European Security Strategy acknowledges the new reality of European security interests beyond Europe`s borders. 44 But it also requires European strategic autonomy. 45 The Lisbon Treaty
The Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Lisbon Treaty) was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Community (also known as the Treaty of Rome). 46 The document provides the legal framework for relationships between member states and emphasizes the EU`s common values. 47 The Treaty recognizes various security concerns and encourages other EU member states to assist each other only in the face of crisis. However, it does not provide for the Union`s mutual defense.
Article 42 (7) of the Lisbon Treaty states:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.
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Article 42 (7) recognizes sovereign rights of the Union`s individual members for self-defense as well as their rights to choose the form of defense or scope of assistance and as such can hardly be recognized as a mutual defense clause.
The Treaty has potential to consolidate for a common defense of the EU under the CSDP, but until then, any military action of the member states should follow their usual constitutional procedures. 49 However, the Treaty allows the EU to form ad-hoc military formations for specific operations and to deploy troops within and outside European territory.
Common Foreign and Security Policy
In the field of the CFSP the member states act in a strictly intergovernmental framework. 50 The CFSP provides a common framework for the EU member states in which they can interact and cooperate, and serves as a coordinating and advocating mechanism. The CFSP is not a decision making body. In security and defense matters the member states are still acting based on their national interests and preferences. 51 In its current form "the CFSP is not a common policy as such but resembles more of a mechanism by which the foreign policies of the key European states are discussed and reconciled with each other." 52 11
The Legal Authorities of European Defense Cooperation
The security and military missions of the EU are executed by two committees.
First is the ambassadorial level policy making group called the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It functions as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU, which represents the governments of the EU member states and is the highest decision making body of the EU. 53 Based on the international situation, the PSC defines policies and strategic direction within the CFSP and exercises political control. The PSC is also responsible for the EU`s coherent response to a crisis situation. While the European CSDP is a big step towards the dream for a common EU defense, it does not provide a legal basis for the creation of a European army.
According to the scholar of European politics and military policy Jolyon Howorth "in terms of overall structure, there is not, nor has there ever been a case for the constitution of a European army." 59 Howorth argues that "the framework, political, institutional or military for such a body currently does not exist, nor is it necessary that it should. For the foreseeable future, European armed forces will be drawn from national contingents on a voluntary case-by-case basis," 60 in other words, the EU remains a coalition of the willing.
The EU does not have a standing military force. It uses troops and equipment from its member nations to meet contingencies. 61 The transformation process in most
European military forces allows the Union to engage in various operations abroad through the CSDP. The EU has already deployed 27 missions from Africa to Asia.
However, most of them were relatively small in numbers with few exceptions. For example, in Africa the EU engaged an anti-piracy naval flotilla that was twice the size of NATO`s to patrol the Horn of Africa. In the case of Chad and Central African Republic, the EU mobilized 10,000 soldiers from 26 countries to sustain a force of 3,700 for a period of 19 months more than 3,000 miles from Brussels. 62 The EU Battle Group
The agenda of the European Council Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999 drew special attention to the development of a European "rapid reaction capability". 63 According to some researchers "this declaration began the initial steps to create a rapid response capability that the EU could use for small crisis management situations." 64 The
Helsinki Summit declaration led to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) which later was renamed the European Union Battle Group (EUBG).
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The EUBG is a military force with the "minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations." 66 The EU has established 15 multi-national battle groups outfitted by the contributing countries in both personnel and equipment. These groups are designed for deploying on short notice and are under the direct control of the European Council of the EU. 67 However, while most of the EU countries contribute their troops and equipment to the EUBG "the current process per the European Union Treaty states that all member states must decide on a EUBG deployment by consensus." 68 To date, a true EUBG has not been deployed. 69 Europe is making considerable efforts to increase the expeditionary capabilities of its military as only about 10 percent out of nearly 1.7 million men and women in uniform can be deployed. 70 But besides the numbers of deployable troops, Europe has to solve the challenges to project its strategic lift, intelligence and command and control capabilities. 71 
Procurement and Interoperability
In his research paper, Gary D. Stephens refers to three options for states to procure weapons and systems, namely: develop and produce domestically (autarky), purchase from abroad (foreign dependence), or cooperate in development and production (collaboration). 72 He concluded that, "European states exhibit all three characteristics." 73 The situation in the European defense market is a vivid example of the autarkic nature of its policies towards defense procurements and interoperability. 74 As the EU remains the union of sovereign states "nearly everything about the defense market in Europe is tied back to national interests." Martin, just to name a few. 77 But more robust cooperation is still limited by the member states` lack of common interests, capabilities, and defense budgets. Colin Butler noted, "spending is political in nature and often states engage in protectionism." 78 Driven by sovereign interests and the sense of self-defense, leading European defense industries will not be willing to share their technologies and scientific advancements. Yet, in times of economic recession, protectionism in the field of domestic labor in the defense sector is even more sensitive than ever.
Sven Biscop reinforces the concern by arguing that: "Member States fear contributing too much […] to a collective capability as compared to the extent to which they expect to have drawn on it, and invoke sovereignty to resist pooling even of existing capabilities." 79 Until now, the EDA has not reached its ambition for a consolidated European defense industry. Neither has provided "…effective means to overcome the pressures of reduced defense budgets." 80 Europe needed additional ways to meet the challenge, which many believe can be found through the "pooling and sharing" initiative.
Efforts to Pool and Share Resources and Capabilities
In the absence of a common threat, 82 Often mistaken by many as a way to get a "bigger bang for the Euro", the true aim of the pooling and sharing initiative is to address the absence of a coordinated approach between the member states toward cutting defense. 83 The new initiative was well received by a majority of the member states and "pooling and sharing" became the new buzzword. 84 However, some states were less optimistic seeing a more integrated share of capabilities as a potential threat to their sovereignty. 85 Biscop tries to mitigate this concern by arguing his point of view: "Pooling in reality increases sovereignty, empowering member states to operate at levels and in capability areas which on their own they could never hope to achieve." 86 Nevertheless, the concern is still there as countries prefer creating new forms of bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense cooperation agreements such as Franco-British and Nordic pact, the Visegrad Four, the Weimar
Triangle and the South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process. 87 Collaborative efforts also have potential side effects of reduced effectiveness. It makes partners interdependent and any mishaps on one side will have a negative impact on the other side. 88 "Juste retour, fair return work share agreements, can be counter-productive to realizing economic scale savings." 89 Pooling and sharing is the form of collaboration that allows for standardization, interoperability and acquisition of capabilities. 90 But it should not be mistaken by the paradigm of spending less on defense. Rather, it is a way to spend wisely, in a coordinated manner for the common good of the EU member states. But the inner problem with the Ghent Framework lies in the fact, that it is budget driven, rather than based on the lessons learned or comprehensive analysis of what capabilities Europe should develop and for what purposes. Yet, to achieve its aim, the Ghent Framework must win the "beauty contest" between the EU`s "Pooling and Sharing" and NATO`s similar "Smart Defense" initiative. 91 Organizing for Security within NATO
The beginning of the 1990s raised questions and concerns about the future architecture of Europe`s security and the future relationship between the EU and NATO. 92 Eurocontinentalists took advantage of the situation and strongly advocated for the creation of a common European defense structure within the framework of the CFSP. However, the lack of European cohesion, difference in the threat perception and negative experience of the conflict in the Balkans determined that NATO will remain the leading security organization in Europe. 93 During the Balkan conflicts (Bosnia, 1992-95, and Kosovo, 1999) of the 1990s
Europeans found they were incapable of responding to them without the U.S. military and NATO. Specifically, the EU states discovered that there was no security mechanism within the EU besides NATO that European countries could use to forge political consensus among them for military action. There were no European facilities to plan, organize, and manage crisis management missions besides NATO. The result of this deficit meant the EU could not respond to an even purely European crisis without getting NATO and the United States involved. This was a wakeup call for the EU states. 94 The realization that years after the Cold War, there was still no European institution that could undertake these campaigns in Europe`s own backyard was a frustrating and sobering reminder to the Europeans that they needed to put their security house in order. 95 Some European security experts have concluded that "after World War II, the resulting Western European military weakness, American military superiority, and the perceived Soviet threat meant that for most Western European states the Atlantic alliance and the American guarantee were the essential prerequisites for security." Only now is Europe experiencing the full consequences of the dissolution of the threat once posed by the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, close security ties with the United States were an existential concern to Europe. After the Cold War, many old NATO members still prized the alliance as a kind of catastrophic health insurance policy against a resurgent Russia; new members, which had just escaped Russian clutches, saw in NATO`s Article 5 -that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack on them all -a guarantee of their own survival. 97 The Legal Authorities of NATO Defense Cooperation
In contrast to the EU, NATO is a political and military alliance whose primary goals are the collective defense of its members. NATO exercises its leadership through integrated military and civilian command structure and the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
is its political decision-making body which is located in Brussels, Belgium. The
Alliances` military aspects are implemented through NATO`s Military Committee. 98 
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Member countries are represented in NATO headquarters through permanent representations headed by ambassadors. 99 Like the EU, NATO is "an intergovernmental organization in which each member country retains its sovereignty." 100 NATO`s decision making process is based on consensus, which means that there is no qualified majority voting and all votes of members countries are equal. 101 The stable security nucleus in Europe has been reinforced since the creation of NATO and the EU. The membership of the majority of European countries of both of these organizations has only strengthened their political, economic and security ties.
However, while the EU has made significant progress as an entity, it remains a "union of the willing". Even within the EU`s CSDP framework its member states protect their sovereignty and advance their own national interests. understand that the lack of resources and capabilities is too big to generate and maintain Europe`s hard power without U.S. support. However, this factor will not prohibit the Eurocontinentalists from discussing the utility of NATO in the future, especially after the conclusion of the NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2014.
The economic recession in Europe has created considerable social tensions in some of the European countries. This is forcing European governments to prioritize their budgets toward social needs, being well aware that under current circumstances increasing military spending will not gain popular support. Therefore European governments will continue to fortify mutual cooperation under the Ghent Framework and will look for new possibilities for pooling and sharing.
The main goal of the Ghent Framework is to deal with Europe`s current military capabilities shortfalls. However, along with its economic and fiscal challenges Europe is facing a broader dilemma of security issues reinforced by the strategic shift of the U.S.
toward the Asia-Pacific region. The ongoing changes in the strategic security environment raise the question whether the Ghent Framework can be used as an impetus for a paradigm change in Europe`s ability to project its "hard power," thus ensuring its own credible defense posture and becoming a more valuable contributor to global security.
Today Europe is concerned about the U.S. shifting its strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific. Many fear this will lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe thus weakening the security posture in the continent. However, it is very unlikely that the U.S. will leave Europe on its own as it possesses the risk of "backdoor commitments", which means that if any non NATO European country will be involved in the conflict, the U.S. will have to be involved in the conflict resolution anyway but most likely under different terms and conditions. 121 Nevertheless, this should not discourage the U.S. from promoting and assisting Europe in its quest for strategic autonomy as it will allow the U.S.`s smooth and safe pivot towards the Asia-Pacific. 122 One way of minimizing or at least using scarce military resources in a more effective way, could be achieved through connecting, or at least co-locating the NATO and EU military staffs, committees and headquarters. All these institutions of both organizations are located within a few miles of each other using separate facilities, but duplicate many of the same personnel. The European taxpayers are the ones, who pay for this expensive duplication. In the post WW II period Europe was focused on developing its civilian power 124 and proved itself to be quite successful and effective in doing so. By the end of the Cold War, Europe is facing new security challenges in the form of global terrorism, energy security and unstable peripheries. To meet these security challenges and to strengthen its position as a global player, Europe needs to refocus its efforts toward developing its military power, which can be used as a stand-alone or in support of civilian efforts in different crisis situations. But one can doubt, whether Europe is capable of doing so under the EU`s current institutional and legal framework, and without strong support from the United States.
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